S
ince 1989, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has adopted many practices that improve the transparency of its policy actions. The following list includes some of those practices and their initiation dates:
• August 1989: Policy changes in the funds rate target are limited to multiples of 25 basis points.
• February 1994: A press statement describing policy actions is released at the conclusion of any FOMC meeting at which an action was undertaken.
• August 1997: Public acknowledgment is made that policy is formulated in terms of a target for the federal funds rate (the intended funds rate). • August 1997: A quantitative intended funds rate is included in the Directive to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. • May 1999: A press statement is issued immediately following the conclusion of every FOMC meeting at which there are major shifts in the Committee's views about prospective developments. Such statements provide an indication of the policy "bias." • January 2000: A "balance of risks" statement in the announcement replaces the previous policy "bias." After every meeting, the FOMC issues a statement that reports the settings of the target funds rate and the balance of risks.
• March 2002: The vote on the Directive and the names of dissenting members, if any, are included in the press statement.
The purpose of these changes, which have gone a long way toward lifting the traditional veil of secrecy over monetary policy, is to increase transparency of policy, improve accountability, and provide better information to market participants about the future direction of policy. This analysis examines how expectations of market participants about future policy actions have changed over the decade during which these changes were implemented.
Our measure of how market participants respond to "news" is the daily change in the yield on a one-month-ahead futures contract for federal funds. The yield on this contract can be interpreted as a measure of a consensus forecast in the market of the average effective federal funds rate over the next calendar month. For example, the change in the yield on the one-month-ahead federal funds futures contract from the close of business yesterday until the close of business today is a measure of the impact of today's news in the market. This measure of news is not unique, but we have found it highly correlated with measures that other researchers have proposed, as well as with the commentary on economic information that appears in the press. 1
Small changes in our measure of news reflect merely ambient noise in financial markets, absent the revelation of any significant information. From our examination of the data, we have concluded that a change in our measure smaller than 5 basis points in absolute value is insignificant "noise." 2 The behavior of our news measure on days that the FOMC changed the intended federal funds rate is shown in Figure 1 . This figure is rather complex because we have attempted to present a large amount of data.
• The time line starts with October 1988, when trading began in the federal funds futures market, and continues through the December 2001 FOMC meeting when the intended federal funds rate was lowered to 1.75 percent.
• The data shown are the daily changes (close of business to close of business) in the yield 1 For additional discussion and analysis of expectations about future federal funds rates, see Poole and Rasche (2000) and Kuttner (2001) .
2 For a detailed analysis see Poole, Rasche, and Thornton (2002 (ii) From August 1989 until February 1994, all policy actions were 25 basis points or multiples thereof but were not publicly announced. However, with four exceptions, we were able to confirm from newspaper reports that market participants detected the policy action on the day following the decision. (iii) From February 1994 to the present, all policy actions were 25 basis points or multiples thereof and each action was publicly announced by the FOMC following the decision.
Our conclusion from this analysis is that intermeeting moves (the light blue points) generate news to the market. That is, such moves generally surprise markets. In many cases these surprises are large. The FOMC and market participants are not well "synched" in these circumstances. In contrast, policy actions taken at regularly scheduled FOMC meetings, particularly since February 1994, generate little if any news in the market. Such actions have been well anticipated by market participants. The data suggest that these actions at most involved small surprises. In these circumstances the FOMC and market participants seem to be well synched. Our interpretation is that financial market participants have observed incoming information on the economy and have correctly perceived how the FOMC will respond to that information.
The second graph, Figure 2 , refers to cases where "the dog didn't bark"-FOMC meetings at which no policy action was implemented.
• The time line starts with October 1988, when trading began in the federal funds futures market, and continues through the September 2002 FOMC meeting.
• The area shaded in gray, plus and minus 5 basis points, indicates the region that we have defined as insignificant noise in this market.
• There are only nine points over the entire period that we believe indicate surprises to market participants. Four of these occurred before February 1994 and five occurred subsequent to that date. All of the "surprises" are relatively small.
The conclusion from this graph is that the FOMC and market participants have been well synched in those circumstances when the FOMC believed that the incoming information on the economy was not sufficient to justify a policy action. • The data plotted are the daily changes in yield on the one-month-ahead federal funds futures contract. There are a total of 374 observations. • The area shaded in gray indicates a range of plus and minus 5 basis points in which we interpret the daily changes as merely ambient noise in the market. • Fifteen observations (4.0 percent of the total) are positioned below the zero line in blue. These represent events where the funds rate futures contract fell by more than 5 basis points. • Ten observations (2.7 percent of the total) are positioned above the zero line in black. These represent events where the rate rose by more than 5 basis points. • The front page and the Credit Markets column in the Wall Street Journal have been checked for news associated with each of the twentyfive labeled events. The reports that appear there are indicated in Table 1 . In four cases we have not found any "economic news" cited in either source. Six of the labeled changes are the FOMC actions noted in Figure 1 (excluding September 17, 2001, where simultaneously there is economic news, the intermeeting policy action, and the reopening of the equity markets after the terrorist attacks).
Ten of the labeled changes are associated with the release of economic data, including four involving the release of employment data. Three of the labeled changes are associated with congressional testimony of Chairman Greenspan. One labeled change followed public remarks by other Federal Reserve officials. The remaining labeled change is the aftermath of the terrorist attack and intermeeting policy action of September 17, 2001.
The conclusions from Figure 3 are that (i) important news arrives relatively infrequently and (ii) the most significant news is FOMC actions (e.g., April 18, 2001; event 7, below zero line in blue), statements and testimony by FOMC members (e.g., January 11, 2002; event 15, below zero line in blue), or new economic data that market participants believe will affect future FOMC actions (e.g., September 7, 2001; event 10, below zero line in blue).
If markets are well synched with FOMC policy actions, then how far in advance are accurate forecasts formed? In some cases the lead-time is considerable. When the June 2002 contract initially traded, the then-prevailing 3.5 percent intended funds rate was anticipated to hold over the next ten months. This conviction eroded substantially upon the release of the August 2001 advanced retail sales and employment numbers (see event 1 in Table 2 ). Going into the terrorist attacks of 9/11, market participants saw a 3.25 percent intended funds rate in June 2002.
With the terrorist attacks, market expectations of the June 2002 intended funds rate were revised sharply downward to about 2.5 percent, well below the intended funds rate that prevailed over the remainder of September 2001 (see event 2 in Table 2 ). Expectations gradually eroded by a cumulative 75 basis points from mid-September until shortly after the November FOMC meeting, during which time the FOMC reduced the intended funds rate by 100 basis points in two steps.
With the news that the Taliban had left Kabul and the release of data on October retail sales in midNovember, expectations of the June 2002 intended funds rate were revised sharply upward to almost 2.5 percent (see event 3 in Table 2 ). This euphoria lasted only a few days until the release of data on new home construction in October (see event 4 in Table 2 ) and existing-home sales and consumer confidence (see event 5 in Table 2 ). At this time the then-prevailing intended funds rate of 2.0 percent was expected to continue until mid-2002.
The release of manufacturing data for November generated an upward revision of expectations of Table 2 the June 2002 intended funds rate (see event 6 in Table 2 ), but this expectation was reversed when November employment data became available two days later (see event 7 in Table 2 ). From the December 2001 FOMC meeting until the end of May 2002, the June 2002 contract traded in the range of 1.75 to 2.0 percent, with the exception of a couple of days in January. The yield briefly dropped below 1.75 percent after the January 11, 2002, Congressional testimony of Chairman Greenspan, which was widely interpreted as pessimistic and as a signal that an additional cut in the intended funds rate might be forthcoming (see event 8 in Table 2 ). This effect was quite short-lived, and within a few days the yield was back within the 1.75 to 2.0 percent range. After the Chairman's Senate testimony on March 7, 2002, the yield moved to 2.0 percent, indicating a conviction that no later than the May 2002 FOMC meeting the intended funds rate would be raised by 25 basis points (see event 9 in Table 2 ). Between the March FOMC meeting and mid-April, this conviction gradually eroded, and for the month prior to the May FOMC meeting a firmly held conviction prevailed in the market that no change in the intended funds rate would occur before the June FOMC meeting.
R E V I E W

Futures Rate Changes and Reported News Events
We conclude, from the small average size of market surprises concerning FOMC policy changes, that in recent years the market has had an excellent understanding of what the FOMC is doing. For the most part, rate changes occur in response to news that should change rates. These findings, we believe, provide strong evidence of the payoff from greater Fed transparency and greater regularity in monetary policy actions. 
